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XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures  
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Abstract

This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a hash-based digital signature system. It follows existing descriptions in scientific literature. The note specifies the WOTS+ one-time signature scheme, a single-tree (XMSS) and a multi-tree variant (XMSS<sup>MT</sup>) of XMSS. Both variants use WOTS+ as a main building block. XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems. Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is broken. It is suitable for compact implementations, relatively simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks. Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures can withstand attacks using quantum computers.

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## 1. Introduction

A (cryptographic) digital signature scheme provides asymmetric message authentication. The key generation algorithm produces a key pair consisting of a private and a public key. A message is signed using a private key to produce a signature. A message/signature pair can be verified using a public key. A One-Time Signature (OTS) scheme allows using a key pair to sign exactly one message securely. A Many-Time Signature (MTS) system can be used to sign multiple messages.

OTS schemes, and MTS schemes composed from them, were proposed by Merkle in 1979 [Merkle79]. They were well-studied in the 1990s and have regained interest from the mid 2000s onwards because of their resistance against quantum-computer-aided attacks. These kinds of signature schemes are called hash-based signature schemes as they are built out of a cryptographic hash function. Hash-based signature

schemes generally feature small private and public keys as well as fast signature generation and verification but large signatures and relatively slow key generation. In addition, they are suitable for compact implementations that benefit various applications and are naturally resistant to most kinds of side-channel attacks.

Some progress has already been made toward introducing and standardizing hash-based signatures. McGrew, Curcio, and Fluhrer have published an Internet-Draft [MCF17] specifying the Lamport-Diffie-Winternitz-Merkle (LDWM) scheme, also taking into account subsequent adaptations by Leighton and Micali. Independently, Buchmann, Dahmen and Huelsing have proposed XMSS [BDH11], the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme, offering better efficiency and a modern security proof. Very recently, the stateless hash-based signature scheme SPHINCS was introduced [BHH15], with the intent of being easier to deploy in current applications. A reasonable next step toward introducing hash-based signatures is to complete the specifications of the basic algorithms - LDWM, XMSS, SPHINCS and/or variants [Kaliski15].

The eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [BDH11] is the latest stateful hash-based signature scheme. It has the smallest signatures out of such schemes and comes with a multi-tree variant that solves the problem of slow key generation. Moreover, it can be shown that XMSS is secure, making only mild assumptions on the underlying hash function. Especially, it is not required that the cryptographic hash function is collision-resistant for the security of XMSS. Improvements upon XMSS, as described in [HRS16], are part of this note.

This document describes a single-tree and a multi-tree variant of XMSS. It also describes WOTS+, a variant of the Winternitz OTS scheme introduced in [Huelsing13] that is used by XMSS. The schemes are described with enough specificity to ensure interoperability between implementations.

This document is structured as follows. Notation is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 describes the WOTS+ signature system. MTS schemes are defined in Section 4: the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) in Section 4.1, and its Multi-Tree variant (XMSS<sup>MT</sup>) in Section 4.2. Parameter sets are described in Section 5. Section 6 describes the rationale behind choices in this note. The IANA registry for these signature systems is described in Section 7. Finally, security considerations are presented in Section 8.

### 1.1. CFRG Note on Post-Quantum Cryptography

All post-quantum algorithms documented by CFRG are today considered ready for experimentation and further engineering development (e.g. to establish the impact of performance and sizes on IETF protocols). However, at the time of writing, we do not have significant deployment experience with such algorithms.

Many of these algorithms come with specific restrictions, e.g. change of classical interface or less cryptanalysis of proposed parameters than established schemes. CFRG has consensus that all documents describing post-quantum technologies include the above paragraph and a clear additional warning about any specific restrictions, especially as those might affect use or deployment of the specific scheme. That guidance may be changed over time via document updates.

Additionally, for XMSS:

CFRG consensus is that we are confident in the cryptographic security of the signature schemes described in this document against quantum computers, given the current state of the research community's knowledge about quantum algorithms. Indeed, we are confident that the security of a significant part of the Internet could be made dependent on the signature schemes defined in this document, if developers take care of the following.

In contrast to traditional signature schemes, the signature schemes described in this document are stateful, meaning the secret key changes over time. If a secret key state is used twice, no cryptographic security guarantees remain. This is a new property that most developers will not be familiar with and requires careful handling of secret keys. Developers should not use the schemes described here except in systems that prevent the reuse of secret key states.

### 1.2. Conventions Used In This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

## 2. Notation

## 2.1. Data Types

Bytes and byte strings are the fundamental data types. A byte is a sequence of eight bits. A single byte is denoted as a pair of hexadecimal digits with a leading "0x". A byte string is an ordered sequence of zero or more bytes and is denoted as an ordered sequence of hexadecimal characters with a leading "0x". For example, 0xe534f0 is a byte string of length 3. An array of byte strings is an ordered, indexed set starting with index 0 in which all byte strings have identical length. We assume big-endian representation for any data types or structures.

## 2.2. Functions

If  $x$  is a non-negative real number, then we define the following functions:

`ceil(x)` : returns the smallest integer greater than or equal to  $x$ .

`floor(x)` : returns the largest integer less than or equal to  $x$ .

`lg(x)` : returns the logarithm to base 2 of  $x$ .

## 2.3. Operators

When  $a$  and  $b$  are integers, mathematical operators are defined as follows:

`^` :  $a ^ b$  denotes the result of  $a$  raised to the power of  $b$ .

`*` :  $a * b$  denotes the product of  $a$  and  $b$ . This operator is sometimes omitted in the absence of ambiguity, as in usual mathematical notation.

`/` :  $a / b$  denotes the quotient of  $a$  by non-zero  $b$ .

`%` :  $a \% b$  denotes the non-negative remainder of the integer division of  $a$  by  $b$ .

`+` :  $a + b$  denotes the sum of  $a$  and  $b$ .

`-` :  $a - b$  denotes the difference of  $a$  and  $b$ .

`++` :  $a++$  denotes incrementing  $a$  by 1, i.e.,  $a = a + 1$ .

`--` :  $a--$  denotes decrementing  $a$  by 1, i.e.,  $a = a - 1$ .

`<<` : `a << b` denotes a logical left shift with `b` being non-negative, i.e., `a * 2^b`.

`>>` : `a >> b` denotes a logical right shift with `b` being non-negative, i.e. `floor(a / 2^b)`.

The standard order of operations is used when evaluating arithmetic expressions.

Arrays are used in the common way, where the  $i^{\text{th}}$  element of an array `A` is denoted `A[i]`. Byte strings are treated as arrays of bytes where necessary: If `X` is a byte string, then `X[i]` denotes its  $i^{\text{th}}$  byte, where `X[0]` is the leftmost byte.

If `A` and `B` are byte strings of equal length, then:

`A AND B` denotes the bitwise logical conjunction operation.

`A XOR B` denotes the bitwise logical exclusive disjunction operation.

When `B` is a byte and `i` is an integer, then `B >> i` denotes the logical right-shift operation. Similarly, `B << i` denotes the logical left-shift operation.

If `X` is an `x`-byte string and `Y` a `y`-byte string, then `X || Y` denotes the concatenation of `X` and `Y`, with `X || Y = X[0] ... X[x-1] Y[0] ... Y[y-1]`.

## 2.4. Integer to Byte Conversion

If `x` and `y` are non-negative integers, we define `Z = toByte(x, y)` to be the `y`-byte string containing the binary representation of `x` in big-endian byte-order.

## 2.5. Hash Function Address Scheme

The schemes described in this document randomize each hash function call. This means that aside from the initial message digest, for each hash function call a different key and different bitmask is used. These values are pseudorandomly generated using a pseudorandom function that takes a key `SEED` and a 32-byte address `ADRS` as input and outputs an `n`-byte value, where `n` is the security parameter. Here we explain the structure of address `ADRS` and propose setter methods to manipulate the address. We explain the generation of the addresses in the following sections where they are used.

The schemes in the next two sections use two kinds of hash functions parameterized by security parameter  $n$ . For the hash tree constructions, a hash function that maps an  $n$ -byte key and  $2n$ -byte inputs to  $n$ -byte outputs is used. To randomize this function,  $3n$  bytes are needed -  $n$  bytes for the key and  $2n$  bytes for a bitmask. For the OTS scheme constructions, a hash function that maps  $n$ -byte keys and  $n$ -byte inputs to  $n$ -byte outputs is used. To randomize this function,  $2n$  bytes are needed -  $n$  bytes for the key and  $n$  bytes for a bitmask. Consequently, three addresses are needed for the first function and two addresses for the second one.

There are three different types of addresses for the different use cases. One type is used for the hashes in OTS schemes, one is used for hashes within the main Merkle tree construction, and one is used for hashes in the L-trees. The latter is used to compress one-time public keys. All these types share as much format as possible. In the following we describe these types in detail.

The structure of an address complies with word borders, with a word being 32 bits long in this context. Only the tree address is too long to fit a single word but matches a double word. An address is structured as follows. It always starts with a layer address of one word in the most significant bits, followed by a tree address of two words. Both addresses are needed for the multi-tree variant (see Section 4.2) and describe the position of a tree within a multi-tree. They are therefore set to zero in case of single-tree applications. For multi-tree hash-based signatures the layer address describes the height of a tree within the multi-tree starting from height zero for trees at the bottom layer. The tree address describes the position of a tree within a layer of a multi-tree starting with index zero for the leftmost tree. The next word defines the type of the address. It is set to 0 for an OTS address, to 1 for an L-tree address, and to 2 for a hash tree address. Whenever the type word of an address is changed, all following words should be initialized with 0 to prevent non-zero values in unused padding words.

We first describe the OTS address case. In this case, the type word is followed by an OTS address word that encodes the index of the OTS key pair within the tree. The next word encodes the chain address followed by a word that encodes the address of the hash function call within the chain. The last word, called `keyAndMask`, is used to generate two different addresses for one hash function call. The word is set to zero to generate the key. To generate the  $n$ -byte bitmask, the word is set to one.



## An OTS hash address

```

+-----+
| layer address  (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree address   (64 bit)|
+-----+
| type = 0       (32 bit)|
+-----+
| OTS address    (32 bit)|
+-----+
| chain address  (32 bit)|
+-----+
| hash address   (32 bit)|
+-----+
| keyAndMask     (32 bit)|
+-----+

```

We now discuss the L-tree case, which means that the type word is set to one. In that case the type word is followed by an L-tree address word that encodes the index of the leaf computed with this L-tree. The next word encodes the height of the node inside the L-tree and the following word encodes the index of the node at that height, inside the L-tree. This time, the last word, `keyAndMask`, is used to generate three different addresses for one function call. The word is set to zero to generate the key. To generate the most significant  $n$  bytes of the  $2n$ -byte bitmask, the word is set to one. The least significant bytes are generated using the address with the word set to two.

## An L-tree address

```

+-----+
| layer address  (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree address   (64 bit)|
+-----+
| type = 1       (32 bit)|
+-----+
| L-tree address (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree height    (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree index     (32 bit)|
+-----+
| keyAndMask     (32 bit)|
+-----+

```

We now describe the remaining type for the main tree hash addresses. In this case the type word is set to two, followed by a zero padding

of one word. The next word encodes the height of the tree node being input for the next computation, followed by a word that encodes the index of this node at that height. As for the L-tree addresses, the last word, `keyAndMask`, is used to generate three different addresses for one function call. The word is set to zero to generate the key. To generate the most significant  $n$  bytes of the  $2n$ -byte bitmask, the word is set to one. The least significant bytes are generated using the address with the word set to two.

```

      A hash tree address
+-----+
| layer address  (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree address   (64 bit)|
+-----+
| type = 2       (32 bit)|
+-----+
| Padding = 0    (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree height    (32 bit)|
+-----+
| tree index     (32 bit)|
+-----+
| keyAndMask     (32 bit)|
+-----+

```

All fields within these addresses encode unsigned integers. When describing the generation of addresses we use setter methods that take positive integers and set the bits of a field to the binary representation of that integer of the length of the field. We furthermore assume that the `setType()` method sets the four words following the type word to zero.

## 2.6. Strings of Base $w$ Numbers

A byte string can be considered as a string of base  $w$  numbers, i.e. integers in the set  $\{0, \dots, w - 1\}$ . The correspondence is defined by the function `base_w(X, w, out_len)` as follows. If  $X$  is a `len_X`-byte string, and  $w$  is a member of the set  $\{4, 16\}$ , then `base_w(X, w, out_len)` outputs an array of `out_len` integers between 0 and  $w - 1$ . The length `out_len` is REQUIRED to be less than or equal to  $8 * \text{len}_X / \lg(w)$ .

## Algorithm 1: base\_w

Input: len\_X-byte string X, int w, output length out\_len  
 Output: out\_len int array basew

```

int in = 0;
int out = 0;
unsigned int total = 0;
int bits = 0;
int consumed;

for ( consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++ ) {
    if ( bits == 0 ) {
        total = X[in];
        in++;
        bits += 8;
    }
    bits -= lg(w);
    basew[out] = (total >> bits) AND (w - 1);
    out++;
}
return basew;

```

For example, if X is the (big-endian) byte string 0x1234, then base\_w(X, 16, 4) returns the array a = {1, 2, 3, 4}.

```

                X (represented as bits)
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| 0| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 1| 0| 0| 0| 1| 1| 0| 1| 0| 0|
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                X[0]           |           X[1]

                X (represented as base 16 numbers)
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      1      |      2      |      3      |      4      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+

                base_w(X, 16, 4)
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|      1      |      2      |      3      |      4      |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
                a[0]           a[1]           a[2]           a[3]

```

## 2.7. Member Functions

To simplify algorithm descriptions, we assume the existence of member functions. If a complex data structure like a public key PK contains a value X then getX(PK) returns the value of X for this public key.

Accordingly, `setX(PK, X, Y)` sets value `X` in `PK` to the value held by `Y`. Since `camelCase` is used for member function names, a value `z` may be referred to as `Z` in the function name, e.g. `getZ`.

### 3. Primitives

#### 3.1. WOTS+ One-Time Signatures

This section describes the WOTS+ OTS system, in a version similar to [Huelsing13]. WOTS+ is a OTS scheme; while a private key can be used to sign any message, each private key **MUST** be used only once to sign a single message. In particular, if a private key is used to sign two different messages, the scheme becomes insecure.

The section starts with an explanation of parameters. Afterwards, the so-called chaining function, which forms the main building block of the WOTS+ scheme, is explained. A description of the algorithms for key generation, signing and verification follows. Finally, pseudorandom key generation is discussed.

##### 3.1.1. WOTS+ Parameters

WOTS+ uses the parameters `n`, and `w`; they all take positive integer values. These parameters are summarized as follows:

`n` : the message length as well as the length of a private key, public key, or signature element in bytes.

`w` : the Winternitz parameter; it is a member of the set  $\{4, 16\}$ .

The parameters are used to compute values `len`, `len_1` and `len_2`:

`len` : the number of `n`-byte string elements in a WOTS+ private key, public key, and signature. It is computed as  $len = len_1 + len_2$ , with  $len_1 = \text{ceil}(8n / \text{lg}(w))$  and  $len_2 = \text{floor}(\text{lg}(len_1 * (w - 1)) / \text{lg}(w)) + 1$ .

The value of `n` is determined by the cryptographic hash function used for WOTS+. The hash function is chosen to ensure an appropriate level of security. The value of `n` is the input length that can be processed by the signing algorithm. It is often the length of a message digest. The parameter `w` can be chosen from the set  $\{4, 16\}$ . A larger value of `w` results in shorter signatures but slower overall signing operations; it has little effect on security. Choices of `w` are limited to the values 4 and 16 since these values yield optimal trade-offs and easy implementation.

WOTS+ parameters are implicitly included in algorithm inputs as needed.

#### 3.1.1.1. WOTS+ Functions

The WOTS+ algorithm uses a keyed cryptographic hash function  $F$ .  $F$  accepts and returns byte strings of length  $n$  using keys of length  $n$ . More detail on specific instantiations can be found in Section 5. Security requirements on  $F$  are discussed in Section 8. In addition, WOTS+ uses a pseudorandom function PRF. PRF takes as input an  $n$ -byte key and a 32-byte index and generates pseudorandom outputs of length  $n$ . More detail on specific instantiations can be found in Section 5. Security requirements on PRF are discussed in Section 8.

#### 3.1.2. WOTS+ Chaining Function

The chaining function (Algorithm 2) computes an iteration of  $F$  on an  $n$ -byte input using outputs of PRF. It takes an OTS hash address as input. This address will have the first six 32-bit words set to encode the address of this chain. In each iteration, PRF is used to generate a key for  $F$  and a bitmask that is XORed to the intermediate result before it is processed by  $F$ . In the following,  $ADRS$  is a 32-byte OTS hash address as specified in Section 2.5 and  $SEED$  is an  $n$ -byte string. To generate the keys and bitmasks, PRF is called with  $SEED$  as key and  $ADRS$  as input. The chaining function takes as input an  $n$ -byte string  $X$ , a start index  $i$ , a number of steps  $s$ , as well as  $ADRS$  and  $SEED$ . The chaining function returns as output the value obtained by iterating  $F$  for  $s$  times on input  $X$ , using the outputs of PRF.

## Algorithm 2: chain - Chaining Function

Input: Input string X, start index i, number of steps s,  
seed SEED, address ADRS

Output: value of F iterated s times on X

```
if ( s == 0 ) {
    return X;
}
if ( ( i + s ) > w - 1 ) {
    return NULL;
}
byte[n] tmp = chain(X, i, s - 1, SEED, ADRS);

ADRS.setHashAddress(i + s - 1);
ADRS.setKeyAndMask(0);
KEY = PRF(SEED, ADRS);
ADRS.setKeyAndMask(1);
BM = PRF(SEED, ADRS);

tmp = F(KEY, tmp XOR BM);
return tmp;
```

## 3.1.3. WOTS+ Private Key

The private key in WOTS+, denoted by *sk* (*s* for secret), is a length *len* array of *n*-byte strings. This private key MUST be only used to sign at most one message. Each *n*-byte string MUST either be selected randomly from the uniform distribution or using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom procedure. In the latter case, the security of the used procedure MUST at least match that of the WOTS+ parameters used. For a further discussion on pseudorandom key generation, see Section 3.1.7. The following pseudocode (Algorithm 3) describes an algorithm for generating *sk*.

## Algorithm 3: WOTS\_genSK - Generating a WOTS+ Private Key

```
Input: /
Output: WOTS+ private key sk

for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    initialize sk[i] with a uniformly random n-byte string;
}
return sk;
```

### 3.1.4. WOTS+ Public Key

A WOTS+ key pair defines a virtual structure that consists of `len` hash chains of length `w`. The `len` `n`-byte strings in the private key each define the start node for one hash chain. The public key consists of the end nodes of these hash chains. Therefore, like the private key, the public key is also a length `len` array of `n`-byte strings. To compute the hash chain, the chaining function (Algorithm 2) is used. An OTS hash address `ADRS` and a seed `SEED` have to be provided by the calling algorithm. This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure. Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other parts of `ADRS` than the last three 32-bit words. Please note that the `SEED` used here is public information also available to a verifier. The following pseudocode (Algorithm 4) describes an algorithm for generating the public key `pk`, where `sk` is the private key.

Algorithm 4: WOTS\_genPK - Generating a WOTS+ Public Key From a Private Key

Input: WOTS+ private key `sk`, address `ADRS`, seed `SEED`

Output: WOTS+ public key `pk`

```
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    pk[i] = chain(sk[i], 0, w - 1, SEED, ADRS);
}
return pk;
```

### 3.1.5. WOTS+ Signature Generation

A WOTS+ signature is a length `len` array of `n`-byte strings. The WOTS+ signature is generated by mapping a message to `len` integers between 0 and `w - 1`. To this end, the message is transformed into `len_1` base `w` numbers using the `base_w` function defined in Section 2.6. Next, a checksum is computed and appended to the transformed message as `len_2` base `w` numbers using the `base_w` function. Note that the checksum may reach a maximum value of  $len_1 * (w - 1) * 2^8$  and therefore depends on the parameters `n` and `w`. For the parameter sets given in Section 5 a 32-bit unsigned integer is sufficient. If other parameter settings are used the size of the variable MUST be sufficiently large. Each of the base `w` integers is used to select a node from a different hash chain. The signature is formed by concatenating the selected nodes. An OTS hash address `ADRS` and a seed `SEED` have to be provided by the calling algorithm. This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure. Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm MUST NOT manipulate any other parts of `ADRS` than the last three 32-bit words. Please note that the `SEED` used here is public information

also available to a verifier. The pseudocode for signature generation is shown below (Algorithm 5), where  $M$  is the message and  $sig$  is the resulting signature.

Algorithm 5: WOTS\_sign - Generating a signature from a private key and a message

Input: Message  $M$ , WOTS+ private key  $sk$ , address  $ADRS$ , seed  $SEED$

Output: WOTS+ signature  $sig$

```

csum = 0;

// Convert message to base w
msg = base_w(M, w, len_1);


// Compute checksum
for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i++ ) {
    csum = csum + w - 1 - msg[i];
}

// Convert csum to base w
csum = csum << ( 8 - ( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) % 8 ) );
len_2_bytes = ceil( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) / 8 );
msg = msg || base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w, len_2);
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    sig[i] = chain(sk[i], 0, msg[i], SEED, ADRS);
}
return sig;

```

The data format for a signature is given below.

WOTS+ Signature





### 3.1.6. WOTS+ Signature Verification

In order to verify a signature `sig` on a message `M`, the verifier computes a WOTS+ public key value from the signature. This can be done by "completing" the chain computations starting from the signature values, using the base `w` values of the message hash and its checksum. This step, called `WOTS_pkFromSig`, is described below in Algorithm 6. The result of `WOTS_pkFromSig` is then compared to the given public key. If the values are equal, the signature is accepted. Otherwise, the signature **MUST** be rejected. An OTS hash address `ADRS` and a seed `SEED` have to be provided by the calling algorithm. This address will encode the address of the WOTS+ key pair within a greater structure. Hence, a WOTS+ algorithm **MUST NOT** manipulate any other parts of `ADRS` than the last three 32-bit words. Please note that the `SEED` used here is public information also available to a verifier.

Algorithm 6: `WOTS_pkFromSig` - Computing a WOTS+ public key from a message and its signature

Input: Message `M`, WOTS+ signature `sig`, address `ADRS`, seed `SEED`

Output: 'Temporary' WOTS+ public key `tmp_pk`

```
csum = 0;
```

```
// Convert message to base w
msg = base_w(M, w, len_1);
```

```
// Compute checksum
for ( i = 0; i < len_1; i++ ) {
    csum = csum + w - 1 - msg[i];
}
```

```
// Convert csum to base w
csum = csum << ( 8 - ( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) % 8 ) );
len_2_bytes = ceil( ( len_2 * lg(w) ) / 8 );
msg = msg || base_w(toByte(csum, len_2_bytes), w, len_2);
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
    ADRS.setChainAddress(i);
    tmp_pk[i] = chain(sig[i], msg[i], w - 1 - msg[i], SEED, ADRS);
}
return tmp_pk;
```

Note: XMSS uses `WOTS_pkFromSig` to compute a public key value and delays the comparison to a later point.

### 3.1.7. Pseudorandom Key Generation

An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method suggested in [BDH11] and explained below MAY be used. Other methods MAY be used. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used WOTS+ parameters.

The advantage of generating the private key elements from a random n-byte string is that only this n-byte string needs to be stored instead of the full private key. The key can be regenerated when needed. The suggested method from [BDH11] can be described using PRF. During key generation a uniformly random n-byte string S is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This string S is stored as private key. The private key elements are computed as  $sk[i] = PRF(S, toByte(i, 32))$  whenever needed. Please note that this seed S MUST be different from the seed SEED used to randomize the hash function calls. Also, this seed S MUST be kept secret.

## 4. Schemes

In this section, the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) is described using WOTS+. XMSS comes in two flavors: First, a single-tree variant (XMSS) and second a multi-tree variant (XMSS<sup>MT</sup>). Both allow combining a large number of WOTS+ key pairs under a single small public key. The main ingredient added is a binary hash tree construction. XMSS uses a single hash tree while XMSS<sup>MT</sup> uses a tree of XMSS key pairs.

### 4.1. XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme

XMSS is a method for signing a potentially large but fixed number of messages. It is based on the Merkle signature scheme. XMSS uses four cryptographic components: WOTS+ as OTS method, two additional cryptographic hash functions H and H<sub>msg</sub>, and a pseudorandom function PRF. One of the main advantages of XMSS with WOTS+ is that it does not rely on the collision resistance of the used hash functions but on weaker properties. Each XMSS public/private key pair is associated with a perfect binary tree, every node of which contains an n-byte value. Each tree leaf contains a special tree hash of a WOTS+ public key value. Each non-leaf tree node is computed by first concatenating the values of its child nodes, computing the XOR with a bitmask, and applying the keyed hash function H to the result. The bitmasks and the keys for the hash function H are generated from a (public) seed that is part of the public key using the pseudorandom function PRF. The value corresponding to the root of the XMSS tree forms the XMSS public key together with the seed.

To generate a key pair that can be used to sign  $2^h$  messages, a tree of height  $h$  is used. XMSS is a stateful signature scheme, meaning that the private key changes with every signature generation. To prevent one-time private keys from being used twice, the WOTS+ key pairs are numbered from 0 to  $(2^h) - 1$  according to the related leaf, starting from index 0 for the leftmost leaf. The private key contains an index that is updated with every signature generation, such that it contains the index of the next unused WOTS+ key pair.

A signature consists of the index of the used WOTS+ key pair, the WOTS+ signature on the message and the so-called authentication path. The latter is a vector of tree nodes that allow a verifier to compute a value for the root of the tree starting from a WOTS+ signature. A verifier computes the root value and compares it to the respective value in the XMSS public key. If they match, the signature is declared valid. The XMSS private key consists of all WOTS+ private keys and the current index. To reduce storage, a pseudorandom key generation procedure, as described in [BDH11], MAY be used. The security of the used method MUST at least match the security of the XMSS instance.

#### 4.1.1. XMSS Parameters

XMSS has the following parameters:

$h$  : the height (number of levels - 1) of the tree

$n$  : the length in bytes of the message digest as well as of each node

$w$  : the Winternitz parameter as defined for WOTS+ in Section 3.1

There are  $2^h$  leaves in the tree.

For XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup>, private and public keys are denoted by SK (S for secret) and PK. For WOTS+, private and public keys are denoted by sk (s for secret) and pk, respectively. XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signatures are denoted by Sig. WOTS+ signatures are denoted by sig.

XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> parameters are implicitly included in algorithm inputs as needed.

#### 4.1.2. XMSS Hash Functions

Besides the cryptographic hash function  $F$  and the pseudorandom function PRF required by WOTS+, XMSS uses two more functions:

A cryptographic hash function  $H$ .  $H$  accepts  $n$ -byte keys and byte strings of length  $2n$  and returns an  $n$ -byte string.

A cryptographic hash function  $H_{\text{msg}}$ .  $H_{\text{msg}}$  accepts  $3n$ -byte keys and byte strings of arbitrary length and returns an  $n$ -byte string.

More detail on specific instantiations can be found in Section 5. Security requirements on  $H$  and  $H_{\text{msg}}$  are discussed in Section 8.

#### 4.1.3. XMSS Private Key

An XMSS private key  $SK$  contains  $2^h$  WOTS+ private keys, the leaf index  $idx$  of the next WOTS+ private key that has not yet been used,  $SK_{\text{PRF}}$ , an  $n$ -byte key to generate pseudorandom values for randomized message hashing, the  $n$ -byte value  $root$ , which is the root node of the tree and  $SEED$ , the  $n$ -byte public seed used to pseudorandomly generate bitmasks and hash function keys. Although  $root$  and  $SEED$  formally would be considered only part of the public key, they are needed e.g. for signature generation and hence are also required for functions that do not take the public key as input.

The leaf index  $idx$  is initialized to zero when the XMSS private key is created. The key  $SK_{\text{PRF}}$  MUST be sampled from a secure source of randomness that follows the uniform distribution. The WOTS+ private keys MUST either be generated as described in Section 3.1 or, to reduce the private key size, a cryptographic pseudorandom method MUST be used as discussed in Section 4.1.11.  $SEED$  is generated as a uniformly random  $n$ -byte string. Although  $SEED$  is public, it is critical for security that it is generated using a good entropy source. The root node is generated as described below in the section on key generation (Section 4.1.7). That section also contains an example algorithm for combined private and public key generation.

For the following algorithm descriptions, the existence of a method  $\text{getWOTS\_SK}(SK, i)$  is assumed. This method takes as inputs an XMSS private key  $SK$  and an integer  $i$  and outputs the  $i^{\text{th}}$  WOTS+ private key of  $SK$ .

#### 4.1.4. Randomized Tree Hashing

To improve readability we introduce a function  $\text{RAND\_HASH}(\text{LEFT}, \text{RIGHT}, \text{SEED}, \text{ADRS})$  that does the randomized hashing in the tree. It takes as input two  $n$ -byte values  $\text{LEFT}$  and  $\text{RIGHT}$  that represent the left and the right half of the hash function input, the seed  $\text{SEED}$  used as key for PRF and the address  $\text{ADRS}$  of this hash function call.  $\text{RAND\_HASH}$  first uses PRF with  $\text{SEED}$  and  $\text{ADRS}$  to generate a key  $\text{KEY}$  and  $n$ -byte bitmasks  $\text{BM}_0, \text{BM}_1$ . Then it returns the randomized hash  $H(\text{KEY}, (\text{LEFT XOR } \text{BM}_0) \parallel (\text{RIGHT XOR } \text{BM}_1))$ .

## Algorithm 7: RAND\_HASH

Input: n-byte value LEFT, n-byte value RIGHT, seed SEED,  
address ADRS

Output: n-byte randomized hash

```

ADRS.setKeyAndMask(0);
KEY = PRF(SEED, ADRS);
ADRS.setKeyAndMask(1);
BM_0 = PRF(SEED, ADRS);
ADRS.setKeyAndMask(2);
BM_1 = PRF(SEED, ADRS);

return H(KEY, (LEFT XOR BM_0) || (RIGHT XOR BM_1));

```

## 4.1.5. L-Trees

To compute the leaves of the binary hash tree, a so-called L-tree is used. An L-tree is an unbalanced binary hash tree, distinct but similar to the main XMSS binary hash tree. The algorithm `ltree` (Algorithm 8) takes as input a WOTS+ public key `pk` and compresses it to a single n-byte value `pk[0]`. Towards this end it also takes an L-tree address `ADRS` as input that encodes the address of the L-tree, and the seed `SEED`.

Algorithm 8: `ltree`

Input: WOTS+ public key `pk`, address `ADRS`, seed `SEED`

Output: n-byte compressed public key value `pk[0]`

```

unsigned int len' = len;
ADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
while ( len' > 1 ) {
  for ( i = 0; i < floor(len' / 2); i++ ) {
    ADRS.setTreeIndex(i);
    pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS);
  }
  if ( len' % 2 == 1 ) {
    pk[floor(len' / 2)] = pk[len' - 1];
  }
  len' = ceil(len' / 2);
  ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
}
return pk[0];

```

## 4.1.6. TreeHash

For the computation of the internal  $n$ -byte nodes of a Merkle tree, the subroutine `treeHash` (Algorithm 9) accepts an XMSS private key `SK` (including seed `SEED`), an unsigned integer `s` (the start index), an unsigned integer `t` (the target node height), and an address `ADRS` that encodes the address of the containing tree. For the height of a node within a tree counting starts with the leaves at height zero. The `treeHash` algorithm returns the root node of a tree of height `t` with the leftmost leaf being the hash of the `WOTS+ pk` with index `s`. It is REQUIRED that  $s \% 2^t = 0$ , i.e. that the leaf at index `s` is a left most leaf of a sub-tree of height `t`. Otherwise the hash-addressing scheme fails. The `treeHash` algorithm described here uses a stack holding up to  $(t - 1)$  nodes, with the usual stack functions `push()` and `pop()`. We furthermore assume that the height of a node (an unsigned integer) is stored alongside a node's value (an  $n$ -byte string) on the stack.

Algorithm 9: `treeHash`

Input: XMSS private key `SK`, start index `s`, target node height `t`,  
address `ADRS`

Output:  $n$ -byte root node - top node on Stack

```
if( s % (1 << t) != 0 ) return -1;
for ( i = 0; i < 2^t; i++ ) {
  SEED = getSEED(SK);
  ADRS.setType(0); // Type = OTS hash address
  ADRS.setOTSAddress(s + i);
  pk = WOTS_genPK (getWOTS_SK(SK, s + i), SEED, ADRS);
  ADRS.setType(1); // Type = L-tree address
  ADRS.setLTreeAddress(s + i);
  node = ltree(pk, SEED, ADRS);
  ADRS.setType(2); // Type = hash tree address
  ADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
  ADRS.setTreeIndex(i + s);
  while ( Top node on Stack has same height t' as node ) {
    ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
    node = RAND_HASH(Stack.pop(), node, SEED, ADRS);
    ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
  }
  Stack.push(node);
}
return Stack.pop();
```

#### 4.1.7. XMSS Key Generation

The XMSS key pair is computed as described in XMSS\_keyGen (Algorithm 10). The XMSS public key PK consists of the root of the binary hash tree and the seed SEED, both also stored in SK. The root is computed using treeHash. For XMSS, there is only a single main tree. Hence, the used address is set to the all-zero string in the beginning. Note that we do not define any specific format or handling for the XMSS private key SK by introducing this algorithm. It relates to requirements described earlier and simply shows a basic but very inefficient example to initialize a private key.

Algorithm 10: XMSS\_keyGen - Generate an XMSS key pair

```
Input: /
Output: XMSS private key SK, XMSS public key PK

// Example initialization for SK-specific contents
idx = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < 2^h; i++ ) {
    wots_sk[i] = WOTS_genSK();
}
initialize SK_PRF with a uniformly random n-byte string;
setSK_PRF(SK, SK_PRF);


// Initialization for common contents
initialize SEED with a uniformly random n-byte string;
setSEED(SK, SEED);
setWOTS_SK(SK, wots_sk);
ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
root = treeHash(SK, 0, h, ADRS);

SK = idx || wots_sk || SK_PRF || root || SEED;
PK = OID || root || SEED;
return (SK || PK);
```

The above is just an example algorithm. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use pseudorandom key generation to reduce the private key size. Public and private key generation MAY be interleaved to save space. Especially, when a pseudorandom method is used to generate the private key, generation MAY be done when the respective WOTS+ key pair is needed by treeHash.

The format of an XMSS public key is given below.

## XMSS Public Key



## 4.1.8. XMSS Signature

An XMSS signature is a  $(4 + n + (\text{len} + h) * n)$ -byte string consisting of

the index `idx_sig` of the used WOTS+ key pair (4 bytes),

a byte string `r` used for randomized message hashing (n bytes),

a WOTS+ signature `sig_ots` ( $\text{len} * n$  bytes),

the so-called authentication path 'auth' for the leaf associated with the used WOTS+ key pair ( $h * n$  bytes).

The authentication path is an array of  $h$   $n$ -byte strings. It contains the siblings of the nodes on the path from the used leaf to the root. It does not contain the nodes on the path itself. These nodes are needed by a verifier to compute a root node for the tree from the WOTS+ public key. A node `Node` is addressed by its position in the tree. `Node(x, y)` denotes the  $y^{\text{th}}$  node on level  $x$  with  $y = 0$  being the leftmost node on a level. The leaves are on level 0, the root is on level  $h$ . An authentication path contains exactly one node on every layer  $0 \leq x \leq h - 1$ . For the  $i^{\text{th}}$  WOTS+ key pair, counting from zero, the  $j^{\text{th}}$  authentication path node is


$$\text{Node}(j, \text{floor}(i / (2^j)) \text{ XOR } 1)$$

The computation of the authentication path is discussed in Section 4.1.9.

The data format for a signature is given below.



## XMSS Signature



## 4.1.9. XMSS Signature Generation

To compute the XMSS signature of a message `M` with an XMSS private key, the signer first computes a randomized message digest using a random value `r`, `idx_sig`, the index of the WOTS+ key pair to be used, and the root value from the public key as key. Then a WOTS+ signature of the message digest is computed using the next unused WOTS+ private key. Next, the authentication path is computed. Finally, the private key is updated, i.e. `idx` is incremented. An implementation **MUST NOT** output the signature before the private key is updated.

The node values of the authentication path **MAY** be computed in any way. This computation is assumed to be performed by the subroutine `buildAuth` for the function `XMSS_sign`, as below. The fastest alternative is to store all tree nodes and set the array in the signature by copying the respective nodes. The least storage-intensive alternative is to recompute all nodes for each signature online using the `treeHash` algorithm (Algorithm 9). There exist several algorithms in between, with different time/storage trade-

offs. For an overview, see [BDS09]. A further approach can be found in [KMN14]. Note that the details of this procedure are not relevant to interoperability; it is not necessary to know any of these details in order to perform the signature verification operation. The following version of `buildAuth` is given for completeness. It is a simple example for understanding, but extremely inefficient. The use of one of the alternative algorithms is strongly RECOMMENDED.

Given an XMSS private key `SK`, all nodes in a tree are determined. Their value is defined in terms of `treeHash` (Algorithm 9). Hence, one can compute the authentication path as follows:

(Example) `buildAuth` - Compute the authentication path for the  $i^{\text{th}}$  WOTS+ key pair

Input: XMSS private key `SK`, WOTS+ key pair index `i`, `ADRS`  
Output: Authentication path `auth`

```
for ( j = 0; j < h; j++ ) {  
    k = floor(i / (2^j)) XOR 1;  
    auth[j] = treeHash(SK, k * 2^j, j, ADRS);  
}
```

We split the description of the signature generation into two main algorithms. The first one, `treeSig` (Algorithm 11), generates the main part of an XMSS signature and is also used by the multi-tree version XMSS<sup>MT</sup>. `XMSS_sign` (Algorithm 12) calls `treeSig` but handles message compression before and the private key update afterwards.

The algorithm `treeSig` (Algorithm 11) described below calculates the WOTS+ signature on an  $n$ -byte message and the corresponding authentication path. `treeSig` takes as inputs an  $n$ -byte message `M'`, an XMSS private key `SK`, and an address `ADRS`. It returns the concatenation of the WOTS+ signature `sig_ots` and authentication path `auth`.

Algorithm 11: treeSig - Generate a WOTS+ signature on a message with corresponding authentication path

Input: n-byte message  $M'$ , XMSS private key SK, ADRS  
 Output: Concatenation of WOTS+ signature sig\_ots and authentication path auth

```

idx_sig = getIdx(SK);
auth = buildAuth(SK, idx_sig, ADRS);
ADRS.setType(0); // Type = OTS hash address
ADRS.setOTSAddress(idx_sig);
sig_ots = WOTS_sign(getWOTS_SK(SK, idx_sig),
                   M', getSEED(SK), ADRS);
Sig = sig_ots || auth;
return Sig;

```

The algorithm XMSS\_sign (Algorithm 12) described below calculates an updated private key SK and a signature on a message M. XMSS\_sign takes as inputs a message M of arbitrary length, and an XMSS private key SK. It returns the byte string containing the concatenation of the updated private key SK and the signature Sig.

Algorithm 12: XMSS\_sign - Generate an XMSS signature and update the XMSS private key

Input: Message M, XMSS private key SK  
 Output: Updated SK, XMSS signature Sig

```

idx_sig = getIdx(SK);
setIdx(SK, idx_sig + 1);
ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
byte[n] r = PRF(getSK_PRF(SK), toByte(idx_sig, 32));
byte[n] M' = H_msg(r || getRoot(SK) || (toByte(idx_sig, n)), M);
Sig = idx_sig || r || treeSig(M', SK, ADRS);
return (SK || Sig);

```

#### 4.1.10. XMSS Signature Verification

An XMSS signature is verified by first computing the message digest using randomness  $r$ , index  $idx\_sig$ , the root from PK and message M. Then the used WOTS+ public key  $pk\_ots$  is computed from the WOTS+ signature using `WOTS_pkFromSig`. The WOTS+ public key in turn is used to compute the corresponding leaf using an L-tree. The leaf, together with index  $idx\_sig$  and authentication path  $auth$  is used to compute an alternative root value for the tree. The verification succeeds if and only if the computed root value matches the one in the XMSS public key. In any other case it MUST return fail.

As for signature generation, we split verification into two parts to allow for reuse in the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> description. The steps also needed for XMSS<sup>MT</sup> are done by the function XMSS\_rootFromSig (Algorithm 13). XMSS\_verify (Algorithm 14) calls XMSS\_rootFromSig as a subroutine and handles the XMSS-specific steps.

The main part of XMSS signature verification is done by the function XMSS\_rootFromSig (Algorithm 13) described below. XMSS\_rootFromSig takes as inputs an index `idx_sig`, a WOTS+ signature `sig_ots`, an authentication path `auth`, an `n`-byte message `M'`, seed `SEED`, and address `ADRS`. XMSS\_rootFromSig returns an `n`-byte string holding the value of the root of a tree defined by the input data.

Algorithm 13: XMSS\_rootFromSig - Compute a root node from a tree signature

Input: index `idx_sig`, WOTS+ signature `sig_ots`, authentication path `auth`, `n`-byte message `M'`, seed `SEED`, address `ADRS`

Output: `n`-byte root value `node[0]`

```
ADRS.setType(0); // Type = OTS hash address
ADRS.setOTSAddress(idx_sig);
pk_ots = WOTS_pkFromSig(sig_ots, M', SEED, ADRS);
ADRS.setType(1); // Type = L-tree address
ADRS.setLTreeAddress(idx_sig);
byte[n][2] node;
node[0] = ltree(pk_ots, SEED, ADRS);
ADRS.setType(2); // Type = hash tree address
ADRS.setTreeIndex(idx_sig);
for ( k = 0; k < h; k++ ) {
  ADRS.setTreeHeight(k);
  if ( (floor(idx_sig / (2^k)) % 2) == 0 ) {
    ADRS.setTreeIndex(ADRS.getTreeIndex() / 2);
    node[1] = RAND_HASH(node[0], auth[k], SEED, ADRS);
  } else {
    ADRS.setTreeIndex((ADRS.getTreeIndex() - 1) / 2);
    node[1] = RAND_HASH(auth[k], node[0], SEED, ADRS);
  }
  node[0] = node[1];
}
return node[0];
```

The full XMSS signature verification is depicted below (Algorithm 14). It handles message compression, delegates the root computation to XMSS\_rootFromSig, and compares the result to the value in the public key. XMSS\_verify takes an XMSS signature `Sig`, a message `M`, and an XMSS public key `PK`. XMSS\_verify returns true if and only if

Sig is a valid signature on M under public key PK. Otherwise, it returns false.

Algorithm 14: XMSS\_verify - Verify an XMSS signature using the corresponding XMSS public key and a message

Input: XMSS signature Sig, message M, XMSS public key PK  
Output: Boolean

```

ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
byte[n] M' = H_msg(r || getRoot(PK) || (toByte(idx_sig, n)), M);

byte[n] node = XMSS_rootFromSig(idx_sig, sig_ots, auth, M',
                               getSEED(PK), ADRS);
if ( node == getRoot(PK) ) {
    return true;
} else {
    return false;
}

```

#### 4.1.11. Pseudorandom Key Generation

An implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the XMSS private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method suggested in [BDH11] and explained below MAY be used. Other methods, such as the one in [HRS16], MAY be used. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS parameters.

For XMSS a similar method than the one used for WOTS+ can be used. The suggested method from [BDH11] can be described using PRF. During key generation a uniformly random n-byte string S is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This seed S MUST NOT be confused with the public seed SEED. The seed S MUST be independent of SEED and as it is the main secret, it MUST be kept secret. This seed S is used to generate an n-byte value S\_ots for each WOTS+ key pair. The n-byte value S\_ots can then be used to compute the respective WOTS+ private key using the method described in Section 3.1.7. The seeds for the WOTS+ key pairs are computed as S\_ots[i] = PRF(S, toByte(i, 32)) where i is the index of the WOTS+ key pair. An advantage of this method is that a WOTS+ key can be computed using only len + 1 evaluations of PRF when S is given.

#### 4.1.12. Free Index Handling and Partial Private Keys

Some applications might require to work with partial private keys or copies of private keys. Examples include delegation of signing rights / proxy signatures, and load balancing. Such applications MAY use their own key format and MAY use a signing algorithm different from the one described above. The index in partial private keys or copies of a private key MAY be manipulated as required by the applications. However, applications MUST establish means that guarantee that each index and thereby each WOTS+ key pair is used to sign only a single message.

#### 4.2. XMSS<sup>MT</sup>: Multi-Tree XMSS

XMSS<sup>MT</sup> is a method for signing a large but fixed number of messages. It was first described in [HRB13]. It builds on XMSS. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> uses a tree of several layers of XMSS trees, a so-called hypertree. The trees on top and intermediate layers are used to sign the root nodes of the trees on the respective layer below. Trees on the lowest layer are used to sign the actual messages. All XMSS trees have equal height.

Consider an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> tree of total height  $h$  that has  $d$  layers of XMSS trees of height  $h / d$ . Then layer  $d - 1$  contains one XMSS tree, layer  $d - 2$  contains  $2^{(h / d)}$  XMSS trees, and so on. Finally, layer 0 contains  $2^{(h - h / d)}$  XMSS trees.

##### 4.2.1. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Parameters

In addition to all XMSS parameters, an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> system requires the number of tree layers  $d$ , specified as an integer value that divides  $h$  without remainder. The same tree height  $h / d$  and the same Winternitz parameter  $w$  are used for all tree layers.

All the trees on higher layers sign root nodes of other trees which are  $n$ -byte strings. Hence, no message compression is needed and WOTS+ is used to sign the root nodes themselves instead of their hash values.

##### 4.2.2. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Key generation

An XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key  $SK_{MT}$  ( $S$  for secret) consists of one reduced XMSS private key for each XMSS tree. These reduced XMSS private keys just contain the WOTS+ private keys corresponding to that XMSS key pair and no pseudorandom function key, no index, no public seed, no root node. Instead,  $SK_{MT}$  contains a single  $n$ -byte pseudorandom function key  $SK_{PRF}$ , a single  $(\text{ceil}(h / 8))$ -byte index  $idx_{MT}$ , a single  $n$ -byte seed  $SEED$ , and a single root value  $root$  which is the

root of the single tree on the top layer. The index is a global index over all WOTS+ key pairs of all XMSS trees on layer 0. It is initialized with 0. It stores the index of the last used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer, i.e. a number between 0 and  $2^h - 1$ .

The reduced XMSS private keys MUST either be generated as described in Section 4.1.3 or using a cryptographic pseudorandom method as discussed in Section 4.2.6. As for XMSS, the PRF key SK\_PRF MUST be sampled from a secure source of randomness that follows the uniform distribution. SEED is generated as a uniformly random n-byte string. Although SEED is public, it is critical for security that it is generated using a good entropy source. The root is the root node of the single XMSS tree on the top layer. Its computation is explained below. As for XMSS, root and SEED are public information and would classically be considered part of the public key. However, as both are needed for signing, which only takes the private key, they are also part of SK\_MT.

This document does not define any specific format for the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key SK\_MT as it is not required for interoperability. The algorithm descriptions below use a function `getXMSS_SK(SK, x, y)` that outputs the reduced private key of the x<sup>th</sup> XMSS tree on the y<sup>th</sup> layer.

The XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key PK\_MT contains the root of the single XMSS tree on layer  $d - 1$  and the seed SEED. These are the same values as in the private key SK\_MT. The pseudorandom function PRF keyed with SEED is used to generate the bitmasks and keys for all XMSS trees. XMSSMT\_keyGen (Algorithm 15) shows example pseudocode to generate SK\_MT and PK\_MT. The n-byte root node of the top layer tree is computed using `treeHash`. The algorithm XMSSMT\_keyGen outputs an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key SK\_MT and an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key PK\_MT. The algorithm below gives an example of how the reduced XMSS private keys can be generated. However, any of the above mentioned ways is acceptable as long as the cryptographic strength of the used method matches or superseeds that of the used XMSS<sup>MT</sup> parameter set.

Algorithm 15: XMSSMT\_keyGen - Generate an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> key pair

```

Input: /
Output: XMSSMT private key SK_MT, XMSSMT public key PK_MT

// Example initialization
idx_MT = 0;
setIdx(SK_MT, idx_MT);
initialize SK_PRF with a uniformly random n-byte string;
setSK_PRF(SK_MT, SK_PRF);
initialize SEED with a uniformly random n-byte string;
setSEED(SK_MT, SEED);

// Generate reduced XMSS private keys
ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
for ( layer = 0; layer < d; layer++ ) {
    ADRS.setLayerAddress(layer);
    for ( tree = 0; tree <
        (1 << ((d - 1 - layer) * (h / d)));
        tree++ ) {
        ADRS.setTreeAddress(tree);
        for ( i = 0; i < 2^(h / d); i++ ) {
            wots_sk[i] = WOTS_genSK();
        }
        setXMSS_SK(SK_MT, wots_sk, tree, layer);
    }
}

SK = getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, 0, d - 1);
setSEED(SK, SEED);
root = treeHash(SK, 0, h / d, ADRS);
setRoot(SK_MT, root);


PK_MT = OID || root || SEED;
return (SK_MT || PK_MT);

```

The above is just an example algorithm. It is strongly RECOMMENDED to use pseudorandom key generation to reduce the private key size. Public and private key generation MAY be interleaved to save space. Especially, when a pseudorandom method is used to generate the private key, generation MAY be delayed to the point when the respective WOTS+ key pair is needed by another algorithm.

The format of an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key is given below.



XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Public Key4.2.3. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Signature

An XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature  $Sig_{MT}$  is a byte string of length  $(\text{ceil}(h / 8) + n + (h + d * \text{len}) * n)$ . It consists of

the index  $idx_{sig}$  of the used WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer ( $\text{ceil}(h / 8)$  bytes),


a byte string  $r$  used for randomized message hashing ( $n$  bytes),

$d$  reduced XMSS signatures  $((h / d + \text{len}) * n$  bytes each).

The reduced XMSS signatures only contain a WOTS+ signature  $sig_{ots}$  and an authentication path  $auth$ . They contain no index  $idx$  and no byte string  $r$ .

The data format for a signature is given below.

XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature



#### 4.2.4. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Signature Generation

To compute the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature  $Sig\_MT$  of a message  $M$  using an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key  $SK\_MT$ , XMSS<sup>MT</sup>\_sign (Algorithm 16) described below uses  $treeSig$  as defined in Section 4.1.9. First, the signature index is set to  $idx\_sig$ . Next, PRF is used to compute a pseudorandom  $n$ -byte string  $r$ . This  $n$ -byte string,  $idx\_sig$ , and the root node from  $PK\_MT$  are then used to compute a randomized message digest of length  $n$ . The message digest is signed using the WOTS+ key pair on the bottom layer with absolute index  $idx$ . The authentication path for the WOTS+ key pair is computed as well as the root of the containing XMSS tree. The root is signed by the parent XMSS tree. This is repeated until the top tree is reached.

Algorithm 16: XMSSMT\_sign - Generate an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature and update the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key

Input: Message M, XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key SK<sub>MT</sub>

Output: Updated SK<sub>MT</sub>, signature Sig<sub>MT</sub>

```
// Init
ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
SEED = getSEED(SK_MT);
SK_PRF = getSK_PRF(SK_MT);
idx_sig = getIdx(SK_MT);

// Update SK_MT
setIdx(SK_MT, idx_sig + 1);

// Message compression
byte[n] r = PRF(SK_PRF, toByte(idx_sig, 32));
byte[n] M' = H_msg(r || getRoot(SK_MT) || (toByte(idx_sig, n)), M);

// Sign
Sig_MT = idx_sig;
unsigned int idx_tree
    = (h - h / d) most significant bits of idx_sig;
unsigned int idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_sig;
SK = idx_leaf || getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, idx_tree, 0) || SK_PRF
    || toByte(0, n) || SEED;
ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
Sig_tmp = treeSig(M', SK, ADRS);
Sig_MT = Sig_MT || r || Sig_tmp;
for ( j = 1; j < d; j++ ) {
    root = treeHash(SK, 0, h / d, ADRS);
    idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_tree;
    idx_tree = (h - j * (h / d)) most significant bits of idx_tree;
    SK = idx_leaf || getXMSS_SK(SK_MT, idx_tree, j) || SK_PRF
        || toByte(0, n) || SEED;
    ADRS.setLayerAddress(j);
    ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
    Sig_tmp = treeSig(root, SK, ADRS);
    Sig_MT = Sig_MT || Sig_tmp;
}
return SK_MT || Sig_MT;
```

Algorithm 16 is only one method to compute XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signatures. Especially, there exist time-memory trade-offs that allow to reduce the signing time to less than the signing time of an XMSS scheme with tree height  $h / d$ . These trade-offs prevent certain values from being recomputed several times by keeping a state and distribute all

computations over all signature generations. Details can be found in [Huelsing13a].

#### 4.2.5. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Signature Verification

XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature verification (Algorithm 17) can be summarized as d XMSS signature verifications with small changes. First, the message is hashed. The XMSS signatures are then all on n-byte values. Second, instead of comparing the computed root node to a given value, a signature on this root node is verified. Only the root node of the top tree is compared to the value in the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key. XMSSMT\_verify uses XMSS\_rootFromSig. The function getXMSSSignature(Sig\_MT, i) returns the ith reduced XMSS signature from the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature Sig\_MT. XMSSMT\_verify takes as inputs an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature Sig\_MT, a message M and a public key PK\_MT. XMSSMT\_verify returns true if and only if Sig\_MT is a valid signature on M under public key PK\_MT. Otherwise, it returns false.

Algorithm 17: XMSSMT\_verify - Verify an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature Sig<sub>MT</sub> on a message M using an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key PK<sub>MT</sub>

Input: XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature Sig<sub>MT</sub>, message M,  
XMSS<sup>MT</sup> public key PK<sub>MT</sub>

Output: Boolean

```

idx_sig = getIdx(Sig_MT);
SEED = getSEED(PK_MT);
ADRS = toByte(0, 32);

byte[n] M' = H_msg(getR(Sig_MT) || getRoot(PK_MT)
                  || (toByte(idx_sig, n)), M);

unsigned int idx_leaf
    = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_sig;
unsigned int idx_tree
    = (h - h / d) most significant bits of idx_sig;
Sig' = getXMSSSignature(Sig_MT, 0);
ADRS.setLayerAddress(0);
ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
byte[n] node = XMSS_rootFromSig(idx_leaf, getSig_ots(Sig'),
                               getAuth(Sig'), M', SEED, ADRS);
for ( j = 1; j < d; j++ ) {
    idx_leaf = (h / d) least significant bits of idx_tree;
    idx_tree = (h - j * h / d) most significant bits of idx_tree;
    Sig' = getXMSSSignature(Sig_MT, j);
    ADRS.setLayerAddress(j);
    ADRS.setTreeAddress(idx_tree);
    node = XMSS_rootFromSig(idx_leaf, getSig_ots(Sig'),
                            getAuth(Sig'), node, SEED, ADRS);
}
if ( node == getRoot(PK_MT) ) {
    return true;
} else {
    return false;
}

```

#### 4.2.6. Pseudorandom Key Generation

Like for XMSS, an implementation MAY use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom method to generate the XMSS<sup>MT</sup> private key from a single n-byte value. For example, the method explained below MAY be used. Other methods, such as the one in [HRS16], MAY be used. The choice of a pseudorandom method does not affect interoperability, but the cryptographic strength MUST match that of the used XMSS<sup>MT</sup> parameters.

For XMSS<sup>MT</sup> a method similar to that for XMSS and WOTS+ can be used. The method uses PRF. During key generation a uniformly random n-byte string  $S_{MT}$  is sampled from a secure source of randomness. This seed  $S_{MT}$  is used to generate one n-byte value  $S$  for each XMSS key pair. This n-byte value can be used to compute the respective XMSS private key using the method described in Section 4.1.11. Let  $S[x][y]$  be the seed for the  $x^{\text{th}}$  XMSS private key on layer  $y$ . The seeds are computed as  $S[x][y] = \text{PRF}(\text{PRF}(S, \text{toByte}(y, 32)), \text{toByte}(x, 32))$ .

#### 4.2.7. Free Index Handling and Partial Private Keys

The content of Section 4.1.12 also applies to XMSS<sup>MT</sup>.

### 5. Parameter Sets

This section provides a basic set of parameter sets which are assumed to cover most relevant applications. Parameter sets for two classical security levels are defined. Parameters with  $n = 32$  provide a classical security level of 256 bits. Parameters with  $n = 64$  provide a classical security level of 512 bits. Considering quantum-computer-aided attacks, these output sizes yield post-quantum security of 128 and 256 bits, respectively.

For the  $n = 32$  and  $n = 64$  settings, we give parameters that use SHA2-256, SHA2-512 as defined in [FIPS180], and the SHA3/Keccak-based extendable output functions SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256 as defined in [FIPS202]. The parameter sets using SHA2-256 are mandatory for deployment and therefore MUST be provided by any implementation. The remaining parameter sets specified in this document are OPTIONAL.

SHA2 does not provide a keyed-mode itself. To implement the keyed hash functions the following is used for SHA2 with  $n = 32$ :

```
F: SHA2-256(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M),
H: SHA2-256(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M),
H_msg: SHA2-256(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M),
PRF: SHA2-256(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M).
```

Accordingly, for SHA2 with  $n = 64$  we use:

```
F: SHA2-512(toByte(0, 64) || KEY || M),
H: SHA2-512(toByte(1, 64) || KEY || M),
H_msg: SHA2-512(toByte(2, 64) || KEY || M),
```

```
PRF: SHA2-512(toByte(3, 64) || KEY || M).
```

The  $n$ -byte padding is used for two reasons. First, it is necessary that the internal compression function takes  $2n$ -byte blocks but keys are  $n$  and  $3n$  bytes long. Second, the padding is used to achieve independence of the different function families. Finally, for the PRF no full-fledged HMAC is needed as the message length is fixed, meaning that standard length extension attacks are not a concern here. For that reason, the simpler construction above suffices.

Similar constructions are used with SHA3. To implement the keyed hash functions the following is used for SHA3 with  $n = 32$ :

```
F: SHAKE128(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M, 256),
H: SHAKE128(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M, 256),
H_msg: SHAKE128(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M, 256),
PRF: SHAKE128(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M, 256).
```

Accordingly, for SHA3 with  $n = 64$  we use:

```
F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 64) || KEY || M, 512),
H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 64) || KEY || M, 512),
H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 64) || KEY || M, 512),
PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 64) || KEY || M, 512).
```

As for SHA2, an initial  $n$ -byte identifier is used to achieve independence of the different function families. While a shorter identifier could be used in case of SHA3, we use  $n$  bytes for consistency with the SHA2 implementations.

## 5.1. WOTS+ Parameters

To fully describe a WOTS+ signature method, the parameters  $n$ , and  $w$ , as well as the functions  $F$  and  $PRF$  MUST be specified. This section defines several WOTS+ signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. Values for  $len$  are provided for convenience.

Name	F / PRF	n	w	len
REQUIRED:				
WOTSP_SHA2-256_W16	SHA2-256	32	16	67
OPTIONAL:				
WOTSP_SHA2-512_W16	SHA2-512	64	16	131
WOTSP_SHAKE128_W16	SHAKE128	32	16	67
WOTSP_SHAKE256_W16	SHAKE256	64	16	131

Table 1

The implementation of the single functions is done as described above. XDR formats for WOTS+ are listed in Appendix A.

## 5.2. XMSS Parameters

To fully describe an XMSS signature method, the parameters  $n$ ,  $w$ , and  $h$ , as well as the functions  $F$ ,  $H$ ,  $H_{\text{msg}}$ , and  $\text{PRF}$  MUST be specified. This section defines different XMSS signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. We define parameter sets that implement the functions using SHA2 and SHA3 for  $n = 32$  and  $n = 64$  as described above.



Name	Functions	n	w	len	h
REQUIRED:					
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10	SHA2-256	32	16	67	10
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16	SHA2-256	32	16	67	16
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20	SHA2-256	32	16	67	20
OPTIONAL:					
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H10	SHA2-512	64	16	131	10
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H16	SHA2-512	64	16	131	16
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H20	SHA2-512	64	16	131	20
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H10	SHAKE128	32	16	67	10
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H16	SHAKE128	32	16	67	16
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H20	SHAKE128	32	16	67	20
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H10	SHAKE256	64	16	131	10
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H16	SHAKE256	64	16	131	16
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H20	SHAKE256	64	16	131	20

Table 2

The XDR formats for XMSS are listed in Appendix B.

### 5.3. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> Parameters

To fully describe an XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature method, the parameters  $n$ ,  $w$ ,  $h$ , and  $d$ , as well as the functions  $F$ ,  $H$ ,  $H_{msg}$ , and  $PRF$  MUST be specified. This section defines several XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signature systems, each of which is identified by a name. We define parameter sets that implement the functions using SHA2 and SHA3 for  $n = 32$  and  $n = 64$  as described above.

Name	Functions	n	w	len	h	d
------	-----------	---	---	-----	---	---

REQUIRED:						
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D2	SHA2-256	32	16	67	20	2
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D4	SHA2-256	32	16	67	20	4
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D2	SHA2-256	32	16	67	40	2
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D4	SHA2-256	32	16	67	40	4
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D8	SHA2-256	32	16	67	40	8
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D3	SHA2-256	32	16	67	60	3
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D6	SHA2-256	32	16	67	60	6
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D12	SHA2-256	32	16	67	60	12
OPTIONAL:						
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D2	SHA2-512	64	16	131	20	2
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D4	SHA2-512	64	16	131	20	4
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D2	SHA2-512	64	16	131	40	2
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D4	SHA2-512	64	16	131	40	4
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D8	SHA2-512	64	16	131	40	8
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D3	SHA2-512	64	16	131	60	3
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D6	SHA2-512	64	16	131	60	6
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D12	SHA2-512	64	16	131	60	12
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D2	SHAKE128	32	16	67	20	2
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D4	SHAKE128	32	16	67	20	4
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D2	SHAKE128	32	16	67	40	2
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D4	SHAKE128	32	16	67	40	4
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D8	SHAKE128	32	16	67	40	8
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D3	SHAKE128	32	16	67	60	3

XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D6	SHAKE128	32	16	67	60	6
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D12	SHAKE128	32	16	67	60	12
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D2	SHAKE256	64	16	131	20	2
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D4	SHAKE256	64	16	131	20	4
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D2	SHAKE256	64	16	131	40	2
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D4	SHAKE256	64	16	131	40	4
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D8	SHAKE256	64	16	131	40	8
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D3	SHAKE256	64	16	131	60	3
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D6	SHAKE256	64	16	131	60	6
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D12	SHAKE256	64	16	131	60	12

Table 3

XDR formats for XMSS<sup>MT</sup> are listed in Appendix C.

## 6. Rationale

The goal of this note is to describe the WOTS+, XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> algorithms following the scientific literature. The description is done in a modular way that allows to base a description of stateless hash-based signature algorithms like SPHINCS [BHH15] on it.

This note slightly deviates from the scientific literature using a tweak that prevents multi-user / multi-target attacks against H<sub>msg</sub>. To this end, the public key as well as the index of the used one-time key pair become part of the hash function key. Thereby we achieve a domain separation that forces an attacker to decide which hash value to attack.

For the generation of the randomness used for randomized message hashing, we apply a PRF, keyed with a secret value, to the index of the used one-time key pair instead of the message. The reason is that this requires to process the message only once instead of twice. For long messages this improves speed and simplifies implementations on resource constrained devices that cannot hold the entire message in storage.

We give one mandatory set of parameters using SHA2-256. The reasons are twofold. On the one hand, SHA2-256 is part of most cryptographic libraries. On the other hand, a 256-bit hash function leads to parameters that provide 128 bit of security even against quantum-computer-aided attacks. A post-quantum security level of 256 bit seems overly conservative. However, to prepare for possible cryptanalytic breakthroughs, we also provide OPTIONAL parameter sets using the less widely supported SHA2-512, SHAKE-256, and SHAKE-512 functions.

We suggest the value  $w = 16$  for the Winternitz parameter. No bigger values are included since the decrease in signature size then becomes less significant. Furthermore, the value  $w = 16$  considerably simplifies the implementations of some of the algorithms. Please note that we do allow  $w = 4$ , but limit the specified parameter sets to  $w = 16$  for efficiency reasons.

The signature and public key formats are designed so that they are easy to parse. Each format starts with a 32-bit enumeration value that indicates all of the details of the signature algorithm and hence defines all of the information that is needed in order to parse the format.

The enumeration values used in this note are palindromes, which have the same byte representation in either host order or network order. This fact allows an implementation to omit the conversion between byte order for those enumerations. Note however that the `idx` field used in XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signatures and private keys MUST be properly converted to and from network byte order; this is the only field that requires such conversion. There are  $2^{32}$  XDR enumeration values,  $2^{16}$  of which are palindromes, which is adequate for the foreseeable future. If there is a need for further assignments, non-palindromes can be assigned.

## 7. IANA Considerations

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to create three registries: one for WOTS+ signatures as defined in Section 3, one for XMSS signatures and one for XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signatures; the latter two being defined in Section 4. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the first sets of WOTS+, XMSS, and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> parameter sets are defined in Section 5. Additions to these registries require that a specification be documented in an RFC or another permanent and readily available reference in sufficient detail to make interoperability between independent implementations possible. Each entry in the registry contains the following elements:

a short name, such as "XMSS\_SHA2-256\_W16\_H20",

a positive number, and

a reference to a specification that completely defines the signature method test cases that can be used to verify the correctness of an implementation.

Requests to add an entry to the registry MUST include the name and the reference. The number is assigned by IANA. These number assignments SHOULD use the smallest available palindromic number. Submitters SHOULD have their requests reviewed by the IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) at [cfrg@ietf.org](mailto:cfrg@ietf.org). Interested applicants that are unfamiliar with IANA processes should visit <http://www.iana.org>.

The numbers between 0xDDDDDDDD (decimal 3,722,304,989) and 0xFFFFFFFF (decimal 4,294,967,295) inclusive, will not be assigned by IANA, and are reserved for private use; no attempt will be made to prevent multiple sites from using the same value in different (and incompatible) ways [RFC5226].

The WOTS+ registry is as follows.

Name	Reference	Numeric Identifier
WOTSP_SHA2-256_W16	Section 5.1	0x01000001
WOTSP_SHA2-512_W16	Section 5.1	0x02000002
WOTSP_SHAKE128_W16	Section 5.1	0x03000003
WOTSP_SHAKE256_W16	Section 5.1	0x04000004

Table 4

The XMSS registry is as follows.

Name	Reference	Numeric Identifier
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10	Section 5.2	0x01000001
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16	Section 5.2	0x02000002
XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20	Section 5.2	0x03000003
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H10	Section 5.2	0x04000004
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H16	Section 5.2	0x05000005
XMSS_SHA2-512_W16_H20	Section 5.2	0x06000006
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H10	Section 5.2	0x07000007
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H16	Section 5.2	0x08000008
XMSS_SHAKE128_W16_H20	Section 5.2	0x09000009
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H10	Section 5.2	0x0a00000a
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H16	Section 5.2	0x0b00000b
XMSS_SHAKE256_W16_H20	Section 5.2	0x0c00000c

Table 5

The XMSS<sup>MT</sup> registry is as follows.

Name	Reference	Numeric Identifier
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D2	Section 5.3	0x01000001
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H20_D4	Section 5.3	0x02000002
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D2	Section 5.3	0x03000003
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D4	Section 5.3	0x04000004
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H40_D8	Section 5.3	0x05000005
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D3	Section 5.3	0x06000006
XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D6	Section 5.3	0x07000007

XMSSMT_SHA2-256_W16_H60_D12	Section 5.3	0x08000008
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D2	Section 5.3	0x09000009
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H20_D4	Section 5.3	0x0a00000a
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D2	Section 5.3	0x0b00000b
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D4	Section 5.3	0x0c00000c
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H40_D8	Section 5.3	0x0d00000d
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D3	Section 5.3	0x0e00000e
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D6	Section 5.3	0x0f00000f
XMSSMT_SHA2-512_W16_H60_D12	Section 5.3	0x01010101
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D2	Section 5.3	0x02010102
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H20_D4	Section 5.3	0x03010103
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D2	Section 5.3	0x04010104
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D4	Section 5.3	0x05010105
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H40_D8	Section 5.3	0x06010106
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D3	Section 5.3	0x07010107
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D6	Section 5.3	0x08010108
XMSSMT_SHAKE128_W16_H60_D12	Section 5.3	0x09010109
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D2	Section 5.3	0x0a01010a
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H20_D4	Section 5.3	0x0b01010b
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D2	Section 5.3	0x0c01010c
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D4	Section 5.3	0x0d01010d
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H40_D8	Section 5.3	0x0e01010e
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D3	Section 5.3	0x0f01010f
XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D6	Section 5.3	0x01020201

XMSSMT_SHAKE256_W16_H60_D12	Section 5.3	0x02020202
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Table 6

An IANA registration of a signature system does not constitute an endorsement of that system or its security.

## 8. Security Considerations

A signature system is considered secure if it prevents an attacker from forging a valid signature. More specifically, consider a setting in which an attacker gets a public key and can learn signatures on arbitrary messages of his choice. A signature system is secure if, even in this setting, the attacker can not produce a new message, signature pair of his choosing such that the verification algorithm accepts.

Preventing an attacker from mounting an attack means that the attack is computationally too expensive to be carried out. There exist various estimates for when a computation is too expensive to be done. For that reason, this note only describes how expensive it is for an attacker to generate a forgery. Parameters are accompanied by a bit security value. The meaning of bit security is as follows. A parameter set grants  $b$  bits of security if the best attack takes at least  $2^{(b-1)}$  bit operations to achieve a success probability of  $1/2$ . Hence, to mount a successful attack, an attacker needs to perform  $2^b$  bit operations on average. The given values for bit security were estimated according to [HRS16].

### 8.1. Security Proofs

A full security proof for all schemes described in this document can be found in [HRS16]. This proof shows that an attacker has to break at least one out of certain security properties of the used hash functions and PRFs to forge a signature in any of the described schemes. The proof in [HRS16] considers a different initial message compression than the randomized hashing used here. We comment on this below. For the original schemes, these proofs show that an attacker has to break certain minimal security properties. In particular, it is not sufficient to break the collision resistance of the hash functions to generate a forgery.

More specifically, the requirements on the used functions are that  $F$  and  $H$  are post-quantum multi-function multi-target second-preimage resistant keyed functions,  $F$  fulfills an additional statistical requirement that roughly says that most images have at least two



preimages, PRF is a post-quantum pseudorandom function,  $H_{msg}$  is a post-quantum multi-target extended target collision resistant keyed hash function. For detailed definitions of these properties see [HRS16]. To give some intuition: Multi-function multi-target second preimage resistance is an extension of second preimage resistance to keyed hash functions, covering the case where an adversary succeeds if it finds a second preimage for one out of many values. The same holds for multi-target extended target collision resistance which just lacks the multi-function identifier as target collision resistance already considers keyed hash functions. The proof in [HRS16] splits PRF into two functions. When PRF is used for pseudorandom key generation or generation of randomness for randomized message hashing it is still considered a pseudorandom function. Whenever PRF is used to generate bitmasks and hash function keys it is modeled as a random oracle. This is due to technical reasons in the proof and an implementation using a pseudorandom function is secure.

The proof in [HRS16] considers classical randomized hashing for the initial message compression, i.e.,  $H(r, M)$  instead of  $H(r \parallel \text{getRoot}(PK) \parallel \text{index}, M)$ . This classical randomized hashing allows to get a security reduction from extended target collision resistance [HRS16], a property that is conjectured to be strictly weaker than collision resistance. However, it turns out that in this case, an attacker could still launch a multi-target attack even against multiple users at the same time. The reason is that the adversary attacking  $u$  users at the same time learns  $u * 2^h$  randomized hashes  $H(r_{i_j} \parallel M_{i_j})$  with signature index  $i$  in  $[0, 2^h - 1]$  and user index  $j$  in  $[0, u]$ . It suffices to find a single pair  $(r^*, M^*)$  such that  $H(r^* \parallel M^*) = H(r_{i_u} \parallel M_{i_u})$  for one out of the  $u * 2^h$  learned hashes. Hence, an attacker can do a brute force search in time  $2^n / u * 2^h$  instead of  $2^n$ .

The indexed randomized hashing  $H(r \parallel \text{getRoot}(PK) \parallel \text{toByte}(\text{idx}, n), M)$  used in this work makes the hash function calls position- and user-dependent. This thwarts the above attack because each hash function evaluation during an attack can only target one of the learned randomized hash values. More specifically, an attacker now has to decide which index  $\text{idx}$  and which root value to use for each query. If one assumes that the used hash function is a random function it can be shown that a multi user existential forgery attack that targets this message compression has a complexity of  $2^n$  hash function calls.

The given bit security values were estimated based on the complexity of the best known generic attacks against the required security properties of the used hash and pseudorandom functions assuming conventional and quantum adversaries. At the time of writing,

generic attacks are the best known attacks for the parameters suggested in the classical setting. Also in the quantum setting there are no dedicated attacks known that perform better than generic attacks. Nevertheless, the topic of quantum cryptanalysis of hash functions is not as well understood as in the classical setting.

## 8.2. Minimal Security Assumptions

The security assumptions made to argue for the security of the described schemes are minimal. Any signature algorithm that allows arbitrary size messages relies on the security of a cryptographic hash function, either on collision resistance or on extended target collision resistance if randomized hashing is used for message compression. For the schemes described here this is already sufficient to be secure. In contrast, common signature schemes like RSA, DSA, and ECDSA additionally rely on the conjectured hardness of certain mathematical problems.

## 8.3. Post-Quantum Security

A post-quantum cryptosystem is a system that is secure against attackers with access to a reasonably sized quantum computer. At the time of writing this note, whether or not it is feasible to build such a machine is an open conjecture. However, significant progress was made over the last few years in this regard. Hence, we consider it a matter of risk assessment to prepare for this case.

In contrast to RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, the described signature systems are post-quantum-secure if they are used with an appropriate cryptographic hash function. In particular, for post-quantum security, the size of  $n$  must be twice the size required for classical security. This is in order to protect against quantum square root attacks due to Grover's algorithm. It has been shown in [HRS16] that variants of Grover's algorithm are the optimal generic attacks against the security properties of hash functions required for the described scheme.

As stated above, we only consider generic attacks here, as cryptographic hash functions should be deprecated as soon as there exist dedicated attacks that perform significantly better. This also applies for the quantum setting. As soon as there exist dedicated quantum attacks against the used hash function that perform significantly better than the described generic attacks these hash functions should not be used anymore for the described schemes or the computation of the security level has to be redone.

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## Appendix A. WOTS+ XDR Formats

The WOTS+ signature and public key formats are formally defined using XDR [RFC4506] in order to provide an unambiguous, machine readable definition. Though XDR is used, these formats are simple and easy to parse without any special tools. To avoid the need to convert to and from network / host byte order, the enumeration values are all palindromes. Note that this representation includes all optional parameter sets. The same applies for the XMSS and XMSS<sup>MT</sup> formats below.

WOTS+ parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* ots_algorithm_type identifies a particular
   signature algorithm */

enum ots_algorithm_type {
    wotsp_reserved      = 0x00000000,
    wotsp_sha2-256_w16  = 0x01000001,
    wotsp_sha2-512_w16  = 0x02000002,
    wotsp_shake128_w16  = 0x03000003,
    wotsp_shake256_w16  = 0x04000004,
};
```

WOTS+ signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Byte strings */

typedef opaque bytestring32[32];
typedef opaque bytestring64[64];

union ots_signature switch (ots_algorithm_type type) {
    case wotsp_sha2-256_w16:
    case wotsp_shake128_w16:
        bytestring32 ots_sig_n32_len67[67];

    case wotsp_sha2-512_w16:
    case wotsp_shake256_w16:
        bytestring64 ots_sig_n64_len18[131];

    default:
        void; /* error condition */
};
```

WOTS+ public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
union ots_pubkey switch (ots_algorithm_type type) {
  case wotsp_sha2-256_w16:
  case wotsp_shake128_w16:
    bytestring32 ots_pubk_n32_len67[67];

  case wotsp_sha2-512_w16:
  case wotsp_shake256_w16:
    bytestring64 ots_pubk_n64_len18[131];

  default:
    void; /* error condition */
};
```

## Appendix B. XMSS XDR Formats

XMSS parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Byte strings */
typedef opaque bytestring4[4];
/* Definition of parameter sets */
enum xmss_algorithm_type {
    xmss_reserved          = 0x00000000,

    /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit post-quantum security */
    xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10 = 0x01000001,
    xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16 = 0x02000002,
    xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20 = 0x03000003,

    /* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit post-quantum security */
    xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10 = 0x04000004,
    xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16 = 0x05000005,
    xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20 = 0x06000006,

    /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit post-quantum security */
    xmss_shake128_w16_h10 = 0x07000007,
    xmss_shake128_w16_h16 = 0x08000008,
    xmss_shake128_w16_h20 = 0x09000009,

    /* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit post-quantum security */
    xmss_shake256_w16_h10 = 0x0a00000a,
    xmss_shake256_w16_h16 = 0x0b00000b,
    xmss_shake256_w16_h20 = 0x0c00000c,
};
```

XMSS signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Authentication path types */
union xmss_path switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h10:
        bytestring32 path_n32_t10[10];
};
```

```
case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16:
case xmss_shake128_w16_h16:
    bytestring32 path_n32_t16[16];

case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20:
case xmss_shake128_w16_h20:
    bytestring32 path_n32_t20[20];

case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h10:
    bytestring64 path_n64_t10[10];

case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h16:
    bytestring64 path_n64_t16[16];

case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h20:
    bytestring64 path_n64_t20[20];

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* Types for XMSS random strings */

union random_string_xmss switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10:
case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16:
case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20:
case xmss_shake128_w16_h10:
case xmss_shake128_w16_h16:
case xmss_shake128_w16_h20:
    bytestring32 rand_n32;

case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10:
case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16:
case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h10:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h16:
case xmss_shake256_w16_h20:
    bytestring64 rand_n64;

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* Corresponding WOTS+ type for given XMSS type */
```



```
union xmss_ots_signature switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10:
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16:
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20:
    wotsp_sha2-256_w16;

  case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10:
  case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16:
  case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20:
    wotsp_sha2-512_w16;

  case xmss_shake128_w16_h10:
  case xmss_shake128_w16_h16:
  case xmss_shake128_w16_h20:
    wotsp_shake128_w16;

  case xmss_shake256_w16_h10:
  case xmss_shake256_w16_h16:
  case xmss_shake256_w16_h20:
    wotsp_shake256_w16;

  default:
    void; /* error condition */
};

/* XMSS signature structure */

struct xmss_signature {
  /* WOTS+ key pair index */
  bytestring4 idx_sig;
  /* Random string for randomized hashing */
  random_string_xmss rand_string;
  /* WOTS+ signature */
  xmss_ots_signature sig_ots;
  /* authentication path */
  xmss_path nodes;
};
```

XMSS public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Types for bitmask seed */

union seed switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10:
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16:
  case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20:
```

```
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h10:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h16:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h20:
        bytestring32 seed_n32;

    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10:
    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16:
    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h10:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h16:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h20:
        bytestring64 seed_n64;

    default:
        void;        /* error condition */
};

/* Types for XMSS root node */

union xmss_root switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h10:
    case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h16:
    case xmss_sha2-256_w16_h20:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h10:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h16:
    case xmss_shake128_w16_h20:
        bytestring32 root_n32;

    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h10:
    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h16:
    case xmss_sha2-512_w16_h20:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h10:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h16:
    case xmss_shake256_w16_h20:
        bytestring64 root_n64;

    default:
        void;        /* error condition */
};

/* XMSS public key structure */

struct xmss_public_key {
    xmss_root root; /* Root node */
    seed SEED; /* Seed for bitmasks */
};
```

Appendix C. XMSS<sup>MT</sup> XDR Formats

XMSS<sup>MT</sup> parameter sets are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Byte strings */

typedef opaque bytestring3[3];
typedef opaque bytestring5[5];
typedef opaque bytestring8[8];

/* Definition of parameter sets */

enum xmssmt_algorithm_type {
    xmssmt_reserved          = 0x00000000,

    /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit post-quantum security */

    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2 = 0x01000001,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4 = 0x02000002,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2 = 0x03000003,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4 = 0x04000004,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8 = 0x05000005,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3 = 0x06000006,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6 = 0x07000007,
    xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12 = 0x08000008,

    /* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit post-quantum security */

    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2 = 0x09000009,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4 = 0x0a00000a,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2 = 0x0b00000b,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4 = 0x0c00000c,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8 = 0x0d00000d,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3 = 0x0e00000e,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6 = 0x0f00000f,
    xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12 = 0x01010101,

    /* 256 bit classical security, 128 bit post-quantum security */

    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2 = 0x02010102,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4 = 0x03010103,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2 = 0x04010104,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4 = 0x05010105,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8 = 0x06010106,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3 = 0x07010107,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6 = 0x08010108,
    xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12 = 0x09010109,
```

```
/* 512 bit classical security, 256 bit post-quantum security */  
  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2 = 0x0a01010a,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4 = 0x0b01010b,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2 = 0x0c01010c,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4 = 0x0d01010d,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8 = 0x0e01010e,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3 = 0x0f01010f,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6 = 0x01020201,  
xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12 = 0x02020202,  
};
```

XMSS<sup>MT</sup> signatures are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Type for XMSSMT key pair index */  
/* Depends solely on h */  
  
union idx_sig_xmssmt switch (xmss_algorithm_type type) {  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:  
  case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:  
  case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:  
  case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:  
  case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:  
    bytestring3 idx3;  
  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:  
  case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:  
  case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:  
  case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:  
  case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:  
  case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:  
  case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:  
    bytestring5 idx5;  
  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:  
  case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
```

```
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
    bytestring8 idx8;

default:
    void; /* error condition */
};

union random_string_xmssmt switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
    bytestring32 rand_n32;

case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
```

```
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
        bytestring64 rand_n64;

    default:
        void;      /* error condition */
};

/* Type for reduced XMSS signatures */

union xmss_reduced (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
        bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t77[77];

    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
        bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t72[72];

    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
        bytestring32 xmss_reduced_n32_t87[87];

    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
        bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n32_t141[141];

    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
        bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n32_t136[136];
};
```

```
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
    bytestring64 xmss_reduced_n32_t151[151];

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* xmss_reduced_array depends on d */

union xmss_reduced_array (xmss_algorithm_type type) {
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d2[2];

case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d3[3];

case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d4[4];

case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d6[6];

case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:
```

```
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d8[8];

case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
    xmss_reduced xmss_red_arr_d12[12];

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* XMSS^MT signature structure */

struct xmssmt_signature {
    /* WOTS+ key pair index */
    idx_sig_xmssmt idx_sig;
    /* Random string for randomized hashing */
    random_string_xmssmt randomness;
    /* Array of d reduced XMSS signatures */
    xmss_reduced_array;
};
```

XMSS^MT public keys are defined using XDR syntax as follows:

```
/* Types for bitmask seed */

union seed_switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:
    case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:
    case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
        bytestring32 seed_n32;
```



```
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
    bytestring64 seed_n64;

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* Types for XMSS^MT root node */

union xmssmt_root switch (xmssmt_algorithm_type type) {
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-256_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake128_w16_h60_d12:
    bytestring32 root_n32;

case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h40_d8:
```

```
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_sha2-512_w16_h60_d12:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h20_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d2:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d4:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h40_d8:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d3:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d6:
case xmssmt_shake256_w16_h60_d12:
    bytestring64 root_n64;

default:
    void;      /* error condition */
};

/* XMSS^MT public key structure */

struct xmssmt_public_key {
    xmssmt_root root; /* Root node */
    seed SEED; /* Seed for bitmasks */
};
```

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